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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
KEPLER, NEWTON, EINSTEIN AND THE STRING THEORY 
REPLY TO DAVID ATKINSON 
Apparently, the string theory raises the interesting question of the extent to 
which my typology of pure and hybrid research programs is exhaustive. Before 
I enter into this question, I take the opportunity to use David Atkinson’s lucid 
survey of “pre-string” fundamental physics to indicate some further 
illustrations of cognitive structures explicated in SiS and ICR. 
Brahe-Kepler, Newton, Einstein 
Calling Brahe-Kepler’s program descriptive is not only adequate, we may even 
split the contributions of Brahe and Kepler in terms of an “individual” (i.e. 
individual fact gathering) and an “inductive descriptive subprogram” (SiS, p. 
6, ICR, pp. 171-2), for, as Atkinson indicates, Kepler obtained his three laws 
by inductively generalizing Brahe’s observational data. Newton’s theory of 
gravitation represents not only an evident explanatory program, it is also 
typically equipped with a well-known “evaluation report” (SiS, p. 216, ICR, 
p. 98) of general successes, notably the laws of Kepler, Galileo and the tides, 
and (generalized) individual problems, notably the precessing perihelion of 
Mercury. Moreover, its explanatory successes were not all of the postdictive 
kind; some included corrective predictive successes (SiS, p. 216, ICR, p. 98). 
For example, as elaborated in SiS (Sections 3.1.1, 3.3.2), Newton’s 
explanation of Galileo’s law of free fall is a pure case of “corrective 
reduction.”
Finally, Einstein’s general theory of relativity not only illustrates the notion 
of being (unequivocally, empirically) “more successful” (SiS, p. 230, ICR, 
p. 112), viz. relative to Newton’s theory, but also that “concept explication” 
occurs, not only in philosophy and mathematics, but also in the empirical 
sciences (SiS, pp. 6-9), leading to hybrid explanatory-cum-explicatory 
programs. As a matter of fact, both Einstein’s special and general theories of 
relativity are typically hybrid. The first is hybrid by explicating the notion of 
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simultaneity (see Note 3 of Atkinson’s contribution for some details) and 
explaining light propagation and other experiments (unequivocally better than 
competing theories, SiS, p. 236-237, ICR, pp. 118-9). The general theory is 
hybrid in that it not only explicates away the “occult force of gravitation,” but 
also outstrips Newton’s theory in explanatory success, and not only postdictive 
(e.g. Mercury’s behavior) but also predictive, e.g. the famous light bending 
which was (more or less) confirmed by Eddington’s data. By stating later in 
his paper that “Einstein’s leap was at least in the right direction,” Atkinson 
even seems to support the idea that Einstein’s theory is closer to the truth than 
Newton’s, a claim which I see as an evident example that a theory of truth 
approximation should recognize as a (possible) case of truth approximation 
(ICR, p. 177). However, I know of Atkinson’s reserves in this respect, in 
particular regarding of the existence of “the truth.” As a matter of fact, making 
the characterizability postulate (ICR, p. 147) explicit and its subsequent 
relativisation, is something I owe to him. 
 There is also an interesting global point to make about the three examples 
of research programs, which should have been mentioned in SiS. Atkinson’s 
short stories about (the core ideas underlying) Kepler’s laws and Newton’s and 
Einstein’s theory of gravitation and the common practice to speak of their laws 
and theories instead of their programs, make clear that the development of 
these programs leading to the final theories was mainly a one-person affair. To 
be sure, if we focus on the (continued) “separate evaluation” of Newton’s 
theory and on the application of his laws of motion to other forces than 
gravitation, it typically makes sense to speak of Newton’s program that was 
elaborated by Newton and by others. That is, an evolving (real and virtual) 
coproduction of several researchers, which is typical of many programs, e.g. 
string theory, despite the fact that Edward Witten may rightly be called by 
Atkinson its “most prominent proponent.”
The Nature of the String Program 
When reading Atkinson’s exposition, my attention was suddenly caught by the 
background music on the radio, when a live Proms violin concerto by 
Tchaikovsky (concerto in D, opus 25, August 7, 2001) was abruptly halted 
because of a broken string, which was subsequently repaired by the soloist 
Vadim Repin himself, accompanied by many humorous comments. If we 
interpret the breaking of the string as a metaphor for falsification of the string 
theory and its successful repair as a metaphor for an improved version, perhaps 
even one that comes closer to the truth, Atkinson’s exposition claims that this 
sequence of events is merely possible in principle, not in practice. I must 
confess that I, as a non-specialist, always have doubts about such rigorous 
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claims as these by specialists. However, for the sake of argument I should like 
to dwell upon the question of what type of research program it is if HD testing 
and evaluation will always remain practically impossible. To begin with, I 
have some reserves regarding Atkinson’s hesitation to call it at least in some 
sense explanatory: “for … string theory does not make testable predictions”. I 
would certainly qualify his chain of implication “string theory contains 
Einstein’s general relativistic theory of gravitation, Einstein’s theory contains 
Newton’s theory as an approximation, and Newton’s theory describes [and 
explains, I assume] quantitatively the falling of ‘things’, like planets, moons 
and apples” (p. 100) as a sequence of (partly deductive, partly corrective) 
reductive explanations of, in the end, experimental results. Hence, string 
theory has postdictive explanatory successes. To be sure, apparently none of 
them is an extra success, neither relative to General Relativity nor to the 
Standard Model. It is the specific claims (e.g. space-time has ten dimensions) 
and predictions of a host of particles not predicted by the Standard Model that 
seem impossible to test. Hence, I would call it an explanatory program, albeit 
of a very special kind in two senses, a negative and a positive one. In contrast 
to normal explanatory programs, it cannot be experimentally evaluated. On the 
other hand, as Atkinson strongly emphasizes, the string program has 
‘unification’ of explanatory programs as its chief target, in particular of 
General Relativity and the Standard Model. In this respect, string theory is 
similar to other cases, e.g. “the modern synthesis” unifies and surpasses the 
theories of Darwin, Mendel, and Morgan, but in this case the unifying theory is 
testable, or at least no less testable than the theories it unifies. Hence, as long 
as there are no other examples of untestable explanatory programs of a 
unifying nature, I hesitate to speak of a fifth type. However, I am happy to 
agree that this is essentially a matter of words, not touching upon the really 
special character of the string program.
 Let me conclude by briefly commenting upon Atkinson’s bracketed remark 
“it is still the case that, for many scientists, ‘philosophizing’ is put on a par 
with daydreaming or sloppy reasoning.” This reminds me of course of 
Weinberg’s (1993) chapter “Against philosophy.” It is regrettable in two 
respects. First, it illustrates quite convincingly that diehard positivist, that is, 
(epistemologically) instrumentalist, attitudes cannot only retard but may even 
become ridiculous. But, second, it also illustrates how one-sided it is to 
identify positivist philosophy (of science) with philosophy (of science) in 
general, including the many moderately realist representatives, such as Popper 
and many others, notably philosopher-scientists, from Einstein to Atkinson. 
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